Anomaly detection based on zone partition for security protection of industrial cyber-physical systems by Jun Yang (2084) et al.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL ELECTRONICS
Anomaly Detection Based on Zone Partition for
Security Protection of Industrial Cyber-Physical
Systems
Jun Yang, Chunjie Zhou, Shuanghua Yang, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Integrating the cyber domain and physical do-
main for the flexibility and efficiency of supervision, man-
agement and control is the development tendency of tradi-
tional industrial systems. But, with the deep integration of
these industrial cyber-physical systems, potential security
hazards become severer. Anomaly detection as the front-
end protective barrier plays an important role in security
protection. However, traditional methods mostly focused
on cyber information, without fully considering the char-
acteristics of the physical domain, presenting some limi-
tations. In this paper, a detectable oriented zone partition
method for physical system and a zone-based anomaly de-
tection approach are designed for industrial cyber-physical
systems. In detail, an automated zone partition approach
for the target of ensuring crucial system states can be
represented in more than one zone is designed firstly. And
then, a method of building zone function model without any
prior knowledge of the physical system and analyzing the
anomaly based on zone information are presented. Finally,
an actual testbed is constructed to verify the effectiveness
of the proposed approach. The results demonstrate that the
proposed method presents a high accuracy and good real-
time performance.
Index Terms—Industrial cyber-physical systems, physi-
cal domain, anomaly detection, zone partition, zone func-
tion model.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE rapid growth of information and communicationtechnologies have prompted the traditional industrial
control systems creating a tighter integration between phys-
ical process and cyberspace, and lead to the emergency of
Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPSs) [1], [2]. Integrating
the cyber domain and physical domain provides significantly
less isolation for physical system from the outside world
than predecessor systems, creating a greater vulnerabilities
and cyber security problems [3]. Meanwhile, with the widely
used of public networks and universal protocols, it is very
convenient for attackers to access and acquire the operation
right of the control systems [4]. On the other hand, as the
adversarial sources, attackers try their best efforts to destroy
the system defense and implement the malicious behaviors in
ICPSs. Therefore, the new-type and unknown attacks emerge
in endlessly, and ICPSs are faced with great threats [5]. The
number of security-related incidents in ICPSs are increasing
year by year according to the reports by the Industrial Control
Systems Computer Emergency Readiness Team [6]. Seriously,
as ICPSs have the direct connection for national economy, the
safety of personnel, environment and property, once they are
invaded by malicious attacks, the severity of the catastrophe
would be incalculable [7], [8].
As the front-end protective barrier, intrusion detection plays
an important role in security protection, and it can be classified
as either signature-based or anomaly-based [9]. Signature-
based methods use the database or fixed signatures to identify
attacks, presenting a good result. But they are no fit for ICPSs
as new-type and unknown attacks increasing rapidly. On the
contrary, anomaly-based methods attempt to observe system
behaviors or tendency, which show the capability of addressing
the new or unfamiliar intrusions, and become a most popular
method at present [10].
Unlike IT systems, both cyber domain and physical domain
should be taken into account in anomaly-based detection for
ICPSs. Meanwhile, the main target of cyber attacks in ICPSs
is to cause a catastrophe (such as hazardous accident or
production loss etc.) by manipulating and disrupting physical
process [11]. And due to the feedback control loop, attacks
arbitrarily acting on physical process would break down the
whole system. Nevertheless, when behaviors are concealed or
evidences are insufficient to determine as an anomaly in cyber
domain, the attacks may be neglected if only cyber information
under consideration. Therefore, physical process features are
the key informations for the detection and must be taken into
full consideration.
The physical system often presents a fixed model or pre-
dictable behaviors, which enables that the anomaly could
be analyzed from the true physical process dynamics. These
characteristics have been attracting the attention of many
researchers. In many anomaly detection systems, physical sys-
tem models [12], state equations [13] and statistical methods
[14] were widely used to bulid the feature models of physical
systems. However, models or parameters are hard to obtain in
many actual systems, and the statistical data is undulate as the
disturbance. On the other hand, most of existing methods do
not consider that multiple sensor values and control commands
are invaded simultaneously.
Zone partition is a very effective defense in security pro-
tection, because, it is hard for attacks to intrude sundry
zones simultaneously when the physical system has been
partitioned into multiple zones with different protection and
defensive strategies [15]. Therefore, if a state could be de-
scribed in multiple zones, the anomaly of the state would
be detected in surviving zones. In this paper, a detectable
oriented zone partition method for physical system and a zone-
based anomaly detection approach are designed for ICPSs.
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First, to partition the physical system into multiple zones, and
ensure the crucial states could be represented in more than
one zone, a causal model which includes all variables’ rela-
tionship of physical system is constructed, and an automated
zone partition algorithm on the basis of the causal model is
proposed. Second, to accurately describe crucial states in each
zone, a feedforward neural network is selected to build the
zone function model. And the anomaly analysis conditions
and methods are presented according to the system and zone
features. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed approach is
verified through a series of experiments on an actual testbed. It
is worthy to mention that, the anomaly this paper considering
is caused by attacks, and for an anomaly caused by faults, it
could be detected and analyzed by the mature fault diagnosis
systems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the current anomaly detection technologies in
ICPSs, and the purposes of zone partition for security protec-
tion. Section III proposes a detectable oriented zone partition
approach with an automated algorithm. Section IV presents
an approach to analyze the anomaly in different zones. In
section V, an actual testbed is built for analyzing and verifying
the proposed approach, and then, the accuracy and real-time
performance are discussed. The concluding remarks and future
work are made in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Anomaly Detection in ICPSs
Recent years, anomaly detection both on cyber domain
and physical domain have been widely studied in ICPSs.
From the view of cyber domain, it mainly focused on traffic
analyzing, protocol analyzing, behavior analyzing etc., with
the approaches of statistics-based, model-based, machine-
learning-based and so on [16]–[19]. However, there are some
limitations in these methods, such as: 1) it is hard to deep parse
all of the industrial protocols as the diversity and complexity.
Thus, the problem of false negative and false positive are
more difficult to be solved comparing with IT systems [9];
2) the purpose of attacks is to destroy the physical object, the
abnormal behaviors may not be reflected in cyber domain; and
3) the pathway of attacks is not only from the cyber network,
but also from unsafe mediums., such as Stuxnet which intruded
Siemens systems on the carrier of removable storage devices
[20]. What’s worse, once a deliberate sabotaging behavior
acted on physical system, a disaster accident would happen.
Therefore, it is indispensable to detect the anomaly in physical
domain for ICPSs.
Statistical methods are the most widely used methods for
anomaly detection in physical processes, such as Shewhart
chart, cumulative sum (CUSUM), Exponentially Weighted
Moving Average (EWMA) etc. [14]. Hu X. et al. [21]
employed the hotelling’s T 2 statistic to handle multivariate
anomaly detection problem in control systems. Harrou F. et
al. [22] integrated Principle Component Analysis (PCA) and
EWMA to develop two process-monitoring detecting tools,
T 2-EWMA and Q-EWMA, which exhibited an effective ap-
proach to balance the false negative rate and false positive
rate. Similarly, system state equation was regarded as another
useful method. Ca´rdenas A. et al. [12] used the system state
equation to predict expected outputs, and compared it with
the measured sensors’ value, then CUSUM was introduced
to make an anomaly analysis decision. Fabio P. et al. [23]
proposed a mathematical framework for cyber-physical sys-
tems and attacks based on geometric control theory, which
characterized undetectable and unidentifiable attacks perspec-
tives. Meanwhile, according to some researches, actuators’
behavior logic also was taken into account. Khalili A. and
Sami A. [24] enumerated all regular behaviors of the field
devices, the detection system regarded whether the system
would reach the critical state as the estimation criteria. Li W.
et al. [25] considered the control data were the most direct
and key factors that influenced the behavior of the physical
processes, and focused on control sequences to analyze the
false sequential logic attacks.
But, these methods only consider that one or a few variables
are anomaly. When multi-variables are invaded simultane-
ously, the results would be useless, and if the analyzed vari-
ables are deceived by an intelligent attacker which keeps the
pace with the estimated/expected state, the anomaly could not
be detected under this circumstance. Besides, the expression of
system model or equation of states take a deep professional
knowledge for engineers, and the parameters are hardly to
know or imprecise in actual field systems.
B. Zone Partition for Security Protection
Zone partition and isolation as an effective security pro-
tection method is widely used in IT domain and ICPSs
domain. IEC62443 (one of the most important standards for
industrial systems security protection) introduced a concept of
“zones and conduits” for the intention of facilitating detailed
risk assessment, identifying security measures requirement
and protecting system safety [26]. It strongly suggested that
system designers should partition the network or system into
multiple physical or logical security zones and use the conduits
(specific channels) to communicate among the zones. Based
on this idea, Genge B. et al. [27] regarded the design of
industrial systems as an integer linear programming problem,
and designed a secure scheme on “zones and conduits”. Gao
F. et al. [28] presented a security architecture for intranet
based on zone partition and isolation, and introduced a method
to protect the zone border and communication depending on
the ISO model. Jin Y. et al. [29] partitioned the business
subsystems of military information system (MIS) into different
secure domains, and proposed a MIS access control method
based on security domain-oriented-administrative role-based
control model to manage and control the secure domains.
As a secure strategy of intrusion response, Jee J. et al. [30]
controlled the communication by network control center to
prevent the vicious attacks and invasions spreading to other
subsystems through partitioning and isolating the intruded
subsystems.
On the other hand, zone partition is also a effective and
reliable approach for security or anomaly analysis. Krishnan
K. [31] used an adaptive distributed algorithm to detect large-
scale intrusions by partitioning sensors into multiple virtual
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“computational domains” with relation graph. Yoshihiro H.
et al. [32] constructed a series of cause-effect matrixs from
the relationship of the field physical devices, and evaluated
whether the zone partition result satisfied the detectability for
cyber-attacks detection. And on the basis of it, this group [33]
designed a zone partition method based on fault tree, which
was constructed with the purpose of ensuring system safety,
and employed PCA to detect cyber-attacks. But the detection
did not rely on the partitioned zones, and zone partition
method was hard to handle the conflict between partition and
evaluation.
C. Architecture of Anomaly Detection for ICPSs
Architecture of the approach this paper proposed is shown
in Fig. 1, and it is divided into two parts: 1) system knowledge,
and 2) zone-based anomaly detection. In the first part, system
feature includes the process of control, the information of
field devices, and the disturbance of physical system. Zone
information is the results of zone partition, and zone function
model is used to describe the crucial system state in each
zone. In the second part, the process consists of two processes.
The first is distributed feature calculation in each zone, which
addresses the filed data by filtering and feature extraction
firstly, and then computes the crucial state depending on the
processed data. The second is anomaly analysis. Crucial state
from different zones would be compared with each other, and
anomaly is recognized according to the normal conditions and
the comparison results.
Zone
Information
System Feature
Feature 
Computation
Zone Function 
Model
Zone
Anomaly Analysis
Reports
Zone-Based Anomaly Detection
System 
Knowledge
F
ield
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ata
Normal
Conditions
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Data Preprocessing
Fig. 1. Architecture of the zone-based anomaly detection for ICPSs
III. ZONE PARTITION OF PHYSICAL SYSTEM FOR
ANOMALY DETECTION
As mentioned above, the proposed anomaly detection
method is based on the crucial states which could be described
in different zones. Thus, how to partition the physical system
into multiple zones is the primary task. This section presents
a detectable oriented zone partition method, which is based on
the cause-effect relationships in physical process systems. At
first, a basic causal model for a target node is introduced, and
then the partitioning method based on the basic causal model
is proposed.
A. Causal Model
Causal model describes the cause-effect relationships among
process variables and shows the propagation of influence
which has been widely used in industrial systems [34]. It is
composed by nodes and directed arcs. The nodes represent the
system state variables, the directed arc connecting two nodes
represents the effect propagation direction, and if two adjacent
nodes can affect each other, the arc should be two-way [35].
In this paper, cause model is used to express the qualitative
relationships among the variables of a physical system. For a
target node s (a analyzed variable), its causal model can be
divided into two parts: cause nodes and effect nodes. Cause
nodes are the ones which could affect s, and effect nodes
are the ones which could be affected by s. Fig. 2 shows its
basic structure. cs = fc1s; c2sg is the cause set of s, and es =
fe1s; e2s; e3sg is the effect set. There are both two situations for
the two sets. In cs, c1s can affect not only the target node s,
but also another node e1s, but c
2
s can only affect s. And in es,
e2s will be affected only by s, but e
1
s and e
3
s will be affected
not only by s, but also by c1s and s^.
s^
c2s e
3
s
s
c1s
e1s
e2s
Fig. 2. The basic structure of causal model for the target node s
From the causal model, it can be qualitatively summarized
that: 1) if all the states in cs could be obtained, the state of s
can be inferred; and 2) if any state in es could be obtained,
the state of s can also be inferred. But, in Fig. 2, if the states
of e1s and e
3
s need to be used for analyzing the state of s, their
other cause nodes should be took into consideration. For e3s,
as it can be affected by s and s^, the state of s can not be
inferred only by e3s. In this situation, the two nodes e
3
s and
s^ will be regarded as an entirety in effect set, expressed as
e3
0
s = e
3
s [ s^. But for e1s, as c1s have already been placed in
cs, c1s could not be placed in es. Finally, the corresponding
cause set and effect set for the node of s are cs = fc1s; c2sg
and es = fe1s; e2s; e3
0
s g.
B. Zone Partition Method
Causal model of a physical system represents the inter-
relations of all the variables, and if one or part of the
variables are invaded, the anomaly would be revealed from
others. Detectable oriented zone partition is to separate these
associated variables into multiple zones, and ensure that each
zone could completely represent the states of the target nodes.
According to the qualitative summary for a causal model,
for any node s, cs = fc1s; c2s; : : : ; cms g and es =
fe1s; e2s; : : : ; ens g, where m and n are the number of nodes in
each set, its state can be described by itself, all the elements in
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cs, and each element in es severally. Therefore, a set named
detectable-set is defined for s:
ds = cs  fe1sg  fe2sg      fens g  fsg; (1)
where ‘’ denotes the minkowski sum [36] which means that
each set in the expression is regarded as a mutual independent
element, such as cs, fe1sg, fsg and so on, and the state of the
node s can be described by any element in ds. The detectable-
set for the basic structure in Fig. 2 is: ds = cs  fe1sg 
fe20s g  fsg. The detectable-set for the whole system with `
target nodes is d = fds(i)ji = 1; 2; : : : ; `g.
Therefore, when the target node s, the set of cs, and each
element in es are partitioned into different zones, the state of
s can be observed in these zones. However, first of all, the
basic function of the system must be assured, that is to say,
from the view of system control, the systematic control loop
should be maintained. Sensors and actuators in each control
loop should be regarded as an unseparated group. A set named
partner-set ps is defined in this paper. ps = fn1; n2; : : : ; nkg
denotes that there are k variables in the loop for controlling
the state of s. The partner-sets for the whole system with 
control loops is p = fps(i)ji = 1; 2; : : : ; g.
Zone partition for a complex system by manual efforts is
a time-consuming way. An automated partition algorithm is
proposed in this paper. The principle and detailed steps of
detectable oriented zone partition method are summarized in
Algorithm 1, where ‘?’ denotes empty set, and ‘’ also
represents the minkowski sum. First, cs, each element in
es = fe1s; e2s; : : : ; ens g, and the target node s are partitioned
into different zones; And then, merge all the zones if they
overlap with the same ps.
Algorithm 1 Zone Partition Algorithm.
In: d = fds(i)ji = 1; 2; : : : ; `g
p = fps(i)ji = 1; 2; : : : ; g
Out: z = fziji = 1; 2; : : : ;Mg
1: xa  1
2: for each ds in d do
3: z0  ?; ?
4: if es 6= ? then
5: xb  size of es
6: for xc  1; xb do
7:   fexcs g
8: end for
9: end if
10: if cs 6= ? then
11:   cs
12: end if
13:   fsg
14: for each ps in p do
15: xb  size of 
16:  ?
17: for xc  1; xb do
18: if ps \ (xc) 6= ?
then
19:   [(xc)
20: delete (xc)
21: end if
22: end for
23: z0  zxa 
24: end for
25: z0  z0 
26: for each z0 in z0 do
27: zxa  z0
28: xa  xa + 1
29: end for
30: end for
According to Algorithm 1, there are more than two zones
will be partitioned for any one node, the magnitude of the zone
number will be huge for a complex system. Besides, a node
may be partitioned into multiple zones, and intersections and
contradictions may exist among the zones for different target
nodes. An algorithm is designed to dispose these conflicts,
shown in Algorithm 2. If there are multiple other zones
overlaping with a same zone zi, zi should be deleted. But
if there is only one zone (zj) overlaping with zi, the two
zones can be merged. It is worthy to mention that the terminal
condition of the zone partition is no conflicts among all zones.
Therefore, there are many kinds of partitioning results by this
method, and it could be led to cost different resources and/or
different security protection effectiveness, but it is not the
focus of this paper considering.
Algorithm 2 Conflicts Disposition Algorithm.
In: z = fziji = 1; 2; : : : ;Mg
Out: ~z
1: ~z  ?, xa  1
2: for xb  1;M   1 do
3:  ?
4: for xc  xb + 1;M do
5: if zxb \zxc 6= ? then
6:   zxc
7: end if
8: end for
9: xc  size of 
10: if xc = 0 then
11: ~zxa  zxb
12: else if xc = 1 then
13: ~zxa  
14: else
15: delete zxb
16: end if
17: xa  xa + 1
18: end for
19: ~zxa  zxb
IV. ZONE-BASED ANOMALY DETECTION
The detectable oriented zone partition method mentioned
above ensures that the states of the target nodes (crucial
states) can be observed in multiple zones, but it can only
be analyzed qualitatively. As the anomaly detection is a
quantitative process, building accurate function models for the
crucial states in each zone are necessary.
In this section, a method based on feedforward neural
network is used to build the zone function model, and then,
the conditions for anomaly analysis in each zone are proposed.
A. Zone Function Model
Generally, the function model is built by a precise ex-
pression from system modeling or multivariate fitting, which
are mature techniques. However, it is hard for the engi-
neers who are lacking in modeling knowledge. In this paper,
Back-Propagation Neural Network (BP-NN) is used for zone
function approximation, as its strong ability of mapping and
learning without any prior knowledge of the object systems,
and the capability of approximating to arbitrary continuous
function, which proved by Hornik K. [37], [38].
In any zone a, for a training set Ra = fIai ;Oai gNi=1, where
Iai = fxa1i; xa2i; : : : ; xaMig is M dimensions input variables,
and Oai = foa1i; oa2i; : : : ; oaJig is J dimensions output variables
which denote the crucial states in zone a, an expression of a
three layers BP-NN with L hidden neurons for the jth crucial
state is given by [39]
Z aj (I
a
i ) = f
a
j
 LX
`=1
wa`j  gal (
MX
m=1
!am`x
a
mi   #a` )  aj

; (2)
where ga` is the output function of the `
th neuron, and #a` is
the corresponding threshold. aj is the output layer threshold,
!am` is the weight between the input variable x
a
m and the `
th
hidden neuron, and wa`j is the weight between the `
th hidden
neuron and the jth crucial state. The training of the weight
! and w continues until mean square error falls below some
threshold or tolerance level (), which is given by
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Ea =
1
2
JX
j=1

oaji  Z aj (Iai )
2
< : (3)
Because that the unfavorable factors exist in actual sys-
tems, such as: system disturbance, sensor precision, actuator
response time and so on, data extraction for training set is
indispensability. Therefore, all the training sets should satisfy:
jIai+1   Iai j  a; 8Iai  Ra; (4)
and the threshold a could be determined by
a > maxfa; ag; (5)
where a = fa1 ; a2 ; : : : ; aMg are the sensors’ resolution, a is
the maximum system disturbance, which can be obtained from
specifications and test. And Oa is correspondingly extracted
from the sample dataset.
B. Anomaly Analysis
If a system is uninvaded, the crucial states in each zone
are normal. Thus, the description for the same crucial state
in any two zones should be consistent. In this paper, two
basic conditions, tendency and error between any two curves,
are proposed to evaluate the consistency for the description
of a same crucial state. First, to inspect the consistency of
tendency, cross-correlation algorithm [40] which describes the
pertinence of two curves is used, which given by
Ra;bj (k; 
a;b) =
kP
i=k W
Z aj (I
a
i )Z
b
j (I
b
i+a;b)s
kP
i=k W
 
Z aj (I
a
i )
2 kP
i=k W
 
Z bj (I
b
i+a;b
)
2 ; (6)
where Ra;bj 2 [ 1; 1] is the cross-correlation coefficient of the
jth crucial state in zone a and b. Ra;bj = 1 represents that the
two curves is complete conformity, and Ra;bj =  1 represents
that they are complete inconformity. Therefore, the value is
more close to 1, the better of the pertinence. W denotes
the length of sliding window. a;b denotes the displacement
between the two curves, and if the phase in zone a is ahead of
zone b, then a;b > 0, otherwise a;b  0. And it is a constant
in one designated system. k (k > W ) is the calculating
sequence. Normally, the cross-correlation coefficient is close
to 1, but if any zone is invaded, the vaule would be dropped
rapidly. However, when the two curves Z aj and Z
b
j are steady,
the results will be only determined by the disturbance which
will express a bad result. Therefore, a carrier signal is used to
improve the pertinence of the original curves, which is given
by
L aj (I
a
i ) = Z
a
j (I
a
i )
 
1 + aj sin(!
ai)

; (7)
where aj (
a
j =Z
a
j < 
a
j < 1) is the carrier coefficient,
and the carrier cycle !a is determined by the length of
sliding window. Then, when system is uninvaded, the cross-
correlation coefficient should satisfy
min
kW
fRa;bj (k; a;b)g  a;bj ; (8)
where a;bj is the minimum allowable correlation of the j
th
crucial state between zone a and b.
The cross-correlation coefficient only reflects the tendency
of the two curves, so the error E a;bj between the two curves
which reflects the accuracy of the jth crucial state also should
be taken into account, which is given by
E a;bj (k) =
Z a;bj (Iak ) Z a;bj (Ibk+a;b) ; (9)
and the errors should satisfy
max
k1
fE a;bj (k)g  "a;bj ; (10)
where "a;bj is the maximum allowable error of the j
th crucial
state between zone a and b.
V. EXPERIMENT ON TESTBED
A. Introduction of Testbed
To verify the viability and assess the performance of the
proposed approach, a actual testbed named Coupling Tank
Control System (CTCS) is constructed firstly. As shown in
Fig. 3, CTCS is a simple cyclic water supplying system
among three tanks, and the level in each tank is regulated
by the proportional and automatic valves. Liquidometers are
placed for measuring the real-time liquid level, and in the
pipeline between 1# and 2# tank, there are a flowmeter and
a piezometer. The water circulation depends on motor M and
pressure differential in different tanks. The main target of the
system is to keep the liquid level in 1# and 2# tank stable.
Besides, in CTCS, the controllers consist of PLCs, which
are uniformly supervised and managed by Human Machine
Interface (HMI).
L1
M
V1
V2
V3
1# Tank
2# Tank
3# Tank
L: Liquid Level 
V: Valve
F: Flow 
P: Pressure
L2
P1
L3
F1
F2
F3
Fig. 3. Physical structure of the CTCS
In CTCS, the liquid level among the three tanks are the most
important states with safety consideration. Thus, the crucial
states can be defined as d = fdL1 ;dL2 ;dL3g, and its causal
model is shown in Fig. 4. As F2 and F3 are not detectable
signals, the two nodes are not taken into account.
P1F1
L3L2L1
V3V2V1
Fig. 4. The causal model of CTCS
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Combining with the definition in section III-A, the elements
in d are easy to be obtained, which is shown in Table I(a).
Any node can not be both a cause node and a effect node
for a same crucial state, thus, V2 and V3 are only placed
in the effect sets of the two crucial states. In CTCS, the
liquid level of 1# and 2# tank are the control object, so the
partner-set is p = fpL1 ;pL2g, where pL1 = fL1; V1g, and
pL2 = fL2; V2g. According to the zone partition algorithms,
the devices in CTCS can be partitioned into multiple zones
automaticly. Because that the flow of F1 can be observed by
any one variable of fF1; V1; P1g, and V1 is located in z1, the
variable of F1 is placed in z2 finally. M is placed in z1 for
the requirements of system function. The partition results are
shown in Table I(b).
TABLE I. NODE SETS OF THE CAUSAL MODEL AND ZONE PARTI-
TION RESULTS
(a) Detectable-sets
ds cs es
dL1 fF1; V1g fL2 [ V2g
dL2 fL1; V2g fL3 [ V3 [ P1g
dL3 fL2; P1; V3g ?
(b) Partition Results
Zone Nodes
z1 fL1; V1;Mg
z2 fL2; V2; F1g
z3 fL3; V3; P1g
B. Experiment and Result Analysis
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the effectiveness
of the proposed approach through a series of experiments on
the testbed. First, to explain the advantages of zone partition,
two experiments are conducted to, which are enforced on the
original system and the partitioned system respectively. Then,
the approximation capability and anomaly detection ability of
zone function model is verifyed. And on the basis of it, the
detection accuracy and real-time performance of the proposed
method are discussed.
1) The Comparison of Original System and Partitioned
System: A spoofing attack [9] is designed to act on the original
CTCS and z1 of the partitioned CTCS respectively, which
modifies the configuration of the set point of L1, and maintains
all the measured values from PLCs to HMI at the instant of 50
in the two systems. Fig. 5 shows the level variation tendency in
the two systems, and to facilitate observation, the values of the
level are normalized to [0; 1]. After attacking, as all the states
are deceived by the spoofing attack, there are a few changes
in original CTCS. But, because that z2 and z3 is uninvaded in
partitioned CTCS, the states of the variables in these zones are
true, and the real state of L1 may be able to described by the
survived zones. However, it is still hard to judge whether the
system is anomaly, and find out the zone where the attack is
located in. Therefore, to catch the anomaly, a further analysis
is necessary.
2) The Effectiveness of Zone Function Model for
Anomaly Detection: There are two stages to verify the
availability of the proposed method: 1) training the zone
function model, and 2) verifying the detection ability. In the
training stage, as the change rate of liquid level is more
sensitive than the level itself, the change rates of three tanks
are regarded as the training outputs. And about 3,000 datasets
are synchronously collected in each zone, and some of 80% are
used for training, 20% for test. Fig. 6 shows the approximation
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Fig. 5. The level variation tendency in the two systems
performances of the zone function models, where “measured”
denotes that the vaule is calculated by the sensor’s value, and
“estimated” denotes that the vaule is calculated by zone func-
tion model. And the results indicate that the trained models
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Fig. 6. The performance of zone function model in different zones
have good consistency compared with the actual states, where
L means the change rate, and the abscissa represents the
sample sequence. Further, the thresholds of a;bj and "
a;b
j for
anomaly analysis mentioned in section IV-B can be confirmed
from the results by calculating the minimum cross-correlation
coefficient (Ra;bj ) and the maximum error (E
a;b
j ) between the
measured value and estimated value in different zones. The
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results are shown in Table II.
TABLE II. THE PARAMETERS FOR ANOMALY ANALYSIS
a;bj "
a;b
j
1;2L1 = 0:8719 "
1;2
L1
= 0:0121
2;1L2 = 0:8631 "
2;1
L2
= 0:0126
3;2L3 = 0:8790 "
3;2
L3
= 0:0112
Notes:  = 0;W = 50 and  = 0:005:
Then, A spoofing attack is used to verify the detection
ability of the trained model, which modifies the configuration
of the set point of L1 from 10cm to 20cm, and maintains all
the measured values from PLCs to HMI at the instant of 70
in z1. Fig. 7 shows the analyzing curves of correlations and
errors in different zones. While z1 is modified and deceived,
the crucial states in this zone will much different compared
with other zones. Thus, the values of R1;2L1 , E
1;2
L1
, R2;1L2 and
E 2;1L2 will beyond the normal conditions. And as the z2 and
z3 are uninvaded, the valuse of R
3;2
L3
and E 3;2L3 are in normal.
Further, the anomaly is discovered at the instant of 79 by cross-
correlation coefficients analysis and 76 by errors analysis, the
detection time can be calculated, which is Td = (79 70) Tc,
where Tc = 1s is the sampling period. Although it looks
taking for a long time, it is not sufficient to bring any loss.
Because that the valves adjusting and levels changing are a
slow process, and L1 is only changed less than 1cm during
the detection time.
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Fig. 7. The correlation and errors under spoofing attack
Meanwhile, when calculating cross-correlation coefficients,
the length of sliding window (W ) is a key parameter which
has great influence for the results. Fig. 8 shows the calculating
results on different W . It can be found that if W is too small,
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Fig. 8. The reuslts on different length of sliding window
false alarms will be appeared in normal system. With the
increasing of the length, the number of false alarms will be
decreased, but the time of the true alarms will be put off.
Similarly, the carrier coefficient  is also a key parameter,
and its selecting principle can be found in signal processing.
3) Detection Performance of the Proposed Approach:
Accuracy and real-time capability are the two most important
criteria for evaluating the performance of detection systems,
and the four well-known metrics: False Positive Rate (FPR),
False Negative Rate (FNR), Detecion Accuracy (DA) and
Detecion Time (DT) are used, whose definition can be found
in [9]. First, the following two factors, which are the most
important reasons for influencing the detection performance,
need be analyzed.
 Analysis of Training Conditions: Table III shows the
detection performance under the different training sets with the
same training parameters in BP-NN, where FP and FN denote
false positive number and false negative number, and the
anomaly data is collected under a spoofing attack mentioned
above. Although, the metric of FNR is very low in any
situations, FPR is much different. That is, false alarms appear
frequently in normal system if the training sets include few
operating conditions. The reason is that neural network tends
to learn the zone behavior nor build accurate expression.
Therefore, the more different states for training, the higher
precision of the approximation at some extent.
TABLE III. PERFORMANCE ON DIFFERENT TRAINING CONDITIONS
Datasets Normal Anomaly FP FN FPR FNR DA
400 431 607 350 53 81.21% 8.73% 63.43%
800 431 607 173 2 40.14% 0.33% 77.82%
1200 431 607 37 0 8.58% 0% 94.25%
2600 431 607 1 0 0.23% 0% 99.84%
Notes: the number of training sets is determined by the operating conditions.
 Analysis of Detection Parameters: Table IV shows the
detection performance under different values of  and ", where
 = f1;2L1 ; 
2;1
L2
; 3;2L3g and " = f"
1;2
L1
; "2;1L2 ; "
3;2
L3
g.
The results indicate that there are some conflicts among the
evaluating criteria. FPR and DA can be reduced by relaxing
restrictions, but it need to increase DT. Meanwhile, FNR will
arise if the detection conditions continue to be relaxed. Be-
sides, the detection performance is more sensitvely influenced
by the parameters of " than .
TABLE IV. PERFIRMANCE ON DIFFERENT DETECTION PARAME-
TERS
 " Normal Anomaly FP FN FPR FNR DA DT
0.88 0.12 431 607 71 0 16.47% 0% 89.53% 3:5s
0.88 0.15 431 607 12 0 2.78% 0% 98.06% 7:1s
0.85 0.15 431 607 1 0 0.23% 0% 99.84% 9:3s
0.50 0.30 431 607 0 27 0% 4.45% 100% 14:7s
At last, the detection performance is discussed with attack-
ing on different zones. And the two typical attacks: spoofing
attack and tampering attack [41] are selected, where the
tampering attack is to alter the value from sensors to PLCs.
The results are shown in Table V. It is indicates that the
approach can detect the anomaly with a high precise accuracy
and real-time capability no matter which one zone is invaded.
But, as discussed before, FPR can not avoid completely if FNR
and long DT are unacceptable. Additionally, although there
is little difference for the detection accuracy under different
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TABLE V. THE ACCURACY AND REAL-TIME OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH ON CTCS
Attack Description Dataset Detection Performance
Type Param. Normal Modifying Normal Anomaly FP FN FPR FNR DA DT
Spoofing
Attack
L1 10cm
0cm 1195 1108 5 0 0.42% 0% 99.55% 8:9s
20cm 1186 1157 8 0 0.67% 0% 99.31% 9:1s
L2 5cm
0cm 1121 865 4 0 0.36% 0% 99.54% 9:4s
10cm 1053 842 0 0 0% 0% 100% 8:5s
Tampering
Attack
L1 any
# 0cm 1208 749 7 0 0.58% 0% 99.07% 4:8s
" 20cm 1154 803 2 0 0.17% 0% 99.75% 4:6s
L2 any
# 0cm 1007 544 5 0 0.50% 0% 99.09% 5:2s
" 10cm 1163 532 3 0 0.26% 0% 99.44% 4:5s
DT: the average detection time.
any: The actual value, which would be changed after the tampering attack as the control loop.
" expresses increasing the value smoothly, and # is the opposite. The following number represents the target value.
attacks, the DT is different. Because that, the level is changed
by adjusting the valves in spoofing attack which can only alter
slowly, and in tampering attack, the level is changed directly.
It will be longer under spoofing attack than tampering attack.
But, as the magnitude of L is under 10 2, the actual liquid
level only changes less than 1cm in any situations. In sum,
from the Table V, there are three brief conclusions to be
summarized: 1) attacks can be detected only if their purposes
are to interpose or destroy physical process, 2) the detection
time is just determined by response speed of the physical
system, and the anomaly can be found before falling into
hazard, and 3) each zone has the ability to catch the abnormal.
VI. CONCLUSION
Due to the characteristics of ICPSs, physical domain fea-
tures should be fully considered in anomaly detection sys-
tems. Different from the existing ones, the proposed approach
partitions the physical system into multiple zones, and de-
tects anomaly by analyzing and matching the crucial states
described in different zones whose effectiveness has been
adequately proved. Meanwhile, the method of describing the
crucial states avoids the problem that the model parameters are
inaccurate or the system model is unknown. In detail, an auto-
mated detectable oriented zone partition method is presented
firstly. Then an approach of constructing zone function model
is given without any prior knowledge of the physical system.
Meanwhile, the way of analyzing the anomaly is designed. At
last, experiments illustrate the high accuracy and good real-
time performance of the proposed approach. But, it would be
invalid if all the zones are invaded simultaneously. Therefore,
diversity protection strategies should be executed in different
zones.
Current research work just takes the physical domain into
account. An integrated intrusion detection system should syn-
thesize the information in cyber domain, and distinguish the
anomaly caused by attacks or faults. Therefore, the further
work will focus on the integration of cyber information and
physical feature for intrusion detection in ICPSs.
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